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Abstract 
  This paper considers a quantity-setting oligopoly model with complementary goods where 
labour-managed firms are allowed to offer wage-rise contracts as a strategic commitment. The 
following two stages are considered. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether 
or not to adopt a wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment device. In the second stage, each 
firm independently chooses and sells its actual output. The paper analyses the equilibrium of the 
labour-managed oligopoly model. 
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1. Introduction 
  After the Second World War, the right to manage the firm in the former Yugoslavia was, 
within the limits determined by law, in the hands of its employees (Furubotn and Pejovich, 
1970). The first theoretical analysis of firm behaviour in the former Yugoslavia was done by 
Ward (1958). Since the seminal work by Ward (1958), a great many researchers have analysed 
the behaviour of labour-managed firms. For instance, Laffont and Moreaux (1985) study the 
welfare properties of free-entry Cournot equilibria in labour-managed market economies and 
demonstrate that Cournot equilibria are efficient provided that the market is sufficiently large. 
Okuguchi (1986) compares the Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium prices for the 
labour-managed oligopoly under product differentiation and demonstrates that the Cournot 
equilibrium prices are not lower than the Bertrand ones. Zhang (1993) uses the framework of 
Dixit (1980) and Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985a) and studies whether 
labour-managed firms can hold excess capacity to deter entry and whether they are more or less 
likely to do so than profit-maximizing firms under identical conditions. He demonstrates that it 
is more likely for labour-managed firms than for profit-maximizing firms to keep excess 
capacity to deter entry. Okuguchi (1993) examines two models of duopoly with product 
differentiation and with only labour-managed firms, in one of which two firms’ strategies are 
outputs (labour-managed Cournot duopoly) and prices become strategic variables in the other 
(labour-managed Bertrand duopoly). He demonstrates that if two firms are symmetric, 
leadership is not as advantageous as followership in both labour-managed Cournot-Stackelberg 
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and Bertrand-Stackelberg duopolies with product differentiation. Lambertini and Rossini (1998) 
analyse the behaviour of labour-managed firms in a two-stage Cournot duopoly model with 
capital strategic interaction and demonstrate that labour-managed firms choose their capital 
commitments according to the level of interest rate, unlike what usually happens when only 
profit-maximizing firms operate in the market. Lambertini (2001) considers a spatial 
differentiation duopoly model and demonstrates that if both firms are labour-managed, there 
exists a (symmetric) subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies with firms located at the first 
and third quartiles, if and only if the setup cost is low enough. Ireland (2003) compares the 
behaviour of profit-maximizing firms with that of labour-managed firms in Bertrand oligopoly 
competition and shows that labour-managed firms price lower than profit-maximizing firms. In 
addition, Ohnishi (2007) uses a quantity-setting model with substitute goods where two 
labour-managed firms are allowed to offer wage-rise contracts as a strategic commitment and 
shows that there is an equilibrium in which at least one labour-managed firm adopts the contract. 
There are also many other related excellent research works 
  We examine a Cournot oligopoly model in which labour-managed firms produce 
complementary goods and can offer wage-rise contracts as a strategic commitment. To the best 
of the author’s knowledge, there is no previous work dealing with such economic situation. 
  The purpose of this study is to present the equilibrium of a Cournot oligopoly model with 
complementary goods where labour-managed firms are allowed to offer wage-rise contracts as a 
strategic device. We find that our results are quite different from the results obtained from the 
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labour-managed Cournot oligopoly model with substitute goods. 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the model. Section 3 
presents the equilibrium of the model. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. The model 
  Let us consider a market in which there are n  labour-managed firms producing 
complementary goods. There is no possibility of entry or exit. 
  The market is modelled by means of the following two-stage game. In the first stage, each 
labour-managed firm independently decides whether or not to adopt a wage-rise contract as a 
strategic commitment device. If labour-managed firm i (i = 1, 2, …, n) dose so, then it chooses 
an output level * 0ix  and a wage premium rate 0it . In addition, labour-managed firm i 
agrees to pay each employee a wage premium uniformly if it actually produces more than *ix . 
In the second stage, each labour-managed firm independently chooses and sells its actual output 
0ix . 
  Therefore, firm i’s income per worker is given by 
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*1 2
( , ,..., ) ( )
if ,
( )
( , ,..., ) ( ) ( ) if ,
( )
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i i
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l x
p x x x x rk x x x t f x x
l x
               (1) 
where : nip  denotes firm i’s inverse demand function, (0, )ix  is firm i’s 
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quantity, (0, )ir  is firm i‘s unit cost of capital for, :ik  is firm i’s capital input 
function, (0, )if  is firm i’s fixed cost, and :il  is firm i’s labour input 
function. 
  We assume that there is a unique Cournot equilibrium and each firm’s price, output and 
income per worker are positive in the equilibrium. In addition, the following assumptions are 
made. 
 
Assumption 1: ip  is twice continuously differentiable with bounded derivatives, / 0i ip x  
(downward-sloping demand), and / 0i jp x  (complementary goods) 
( , 1,2,..., ; )i j n i j . 
Assumption 2: i i
j ii j
p p
x x
. 
Assumption 3: 0i
i
dk
dx
 and 
2
2 0
i
i
d k
dx
. 
Assumption 4: 0i
i
dl
dx
 and 
2
2 0
i
i
d l
dx
. 
 
  These are fairly standard assumptions in Cournot oligopoly games except complementary 
goods. Assumption 1 states that demand is downward-sloping. Assumption 2 means that firm i’s 
own effects of quantity on demand exceed firm j’s cross effects. Throughout this paper, we use 
subgame perfection as an equilibrium concept. 
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3. Results 
  We begin by giving supplementary explanations of the model introduced in the previous 
section. We derive labour-managed firm i’s reaction functions in quantities from (1). If firm i 
does not offer a wage-rise contract, its reaction function is defined by 
  1 2
0
( , ,..., ) ( )( ) arg max ,
( )i
i n i i i i i
i i x
i i
p x x x x rk x fR x
l x
                       (2) 
where 1 2 1 1( , ,..., , ,..., )i i i nx x x x x x . On the other hand, if firm i offers a wage-rise contract 
and produces *i ix x , its reaction function is defined by 
  
*
* 1 2
0
( , ,..., ) ( ) ( )( ) arg max .
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i n i i i i i i i i
i i x
i i
p x x x x rk x x x t fR x
l x
               (3) 
Therefore, if firm i sets *ix  and offers a wage-rise contract, its best response is as follows: 
  
*
* *
* *
( ) if ,
ˆ ( ) if ,
( ) if .
i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i
R x x x
R x x x x
R x x x
                                        (4) 
  We now state the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: Both ( )i iR x  and 
*( )i iR x  are downward sloping. 
 
Proof: Firm i’s aim is to maximize income per worker with respect to its own output, given the 
other firms’ output. The Cournot solution needs to satisfy the following conditions: If firm i does 
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not offer a wage-rise contract as a strategic device, the first-order condition for income per 
worker maximization is 
  0,i i ii i i i i i i i i
i i i
p dk dlx p r l p x rk f
x dx dx
                          (5) 
and the second-order condition is 
  
2 2 2
2 22 0.
i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i
p p d k d lx r l p x rk f
x x x dx dx
                      (6) 
  On the other hand, if firm i adopts a wage-rise contract as a strategic device and produces 
*
i ix x , the first-order condition for income per worker maximization is 
  * 0,i i ii i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i
p dk dlx p r t l p x rk t x t x f
x dx dx
                (7) 
and the second-order condition is 
  
2 2 2
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  Moreover, we obtain 
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Since 
2
2 0
i
i
d l
dx
, 0ii i
i
dll x
dx
, and hence 
2
i
i i i
i i i
i j j i
p p dlx l l x
x x x dx
 is positive. Q.E.D. 
 
  Secondly, we present the following lemmas, which provide characterizations of wage-rise 
contracts as a strategic commitment. 
 
Lemma 2: If labour-managed firm i adopts a wage-rise contract and an equilibrium is achieved, 
then at equilibrium *i ix x . 
 
Proof: First, consider the possibility that *i ix x  in equilibrium. From (1), firm i’s 
income-per-worker is 
  
*
1 2( , ,..., ) ( ) ( )
( )
i n i i i i i i i i
i i i
p x x x x rk x x x t f
l x
. 
Here, firm i can increase income per worker by increasing *ix , and the equilibrium solution 
does not change in *i ix x . Hence, 
*
i ix x  does not result in an equilibrium. 
  Next, consider the possibility that *i ix x  in equilibrium. From (1), we see that it is 
impossible for firm i to change its output in equilibrium because such a strategy is not credible. 
That is, wage-rise contracts do not function as a strategic commitment devise. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 3: Labour-managed firm i’s optimal output is smaller when it adopts a wage-rise 
contract as a strategic commitment than when it does not. 
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Proof: From (1), we see that the contract will never decrease the marginal cost of firm i . The 
first-order condition for firm i when its marginal cost is i i ir k x  is (5), and the first-order 
condition for firm i  when its marginal cost is i i i ir k x t  is (7). Here, it  is positive. 
Lemma 2 shows that firm i’s optimal output when it adopts the contract coincides with *ix . To 
satisfy (7), 
2 2 2
2 22
i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i
p p d k d lx r l p x rk f
x x x dx dx
 needs to be positive. Thus, 
firm i’s income-per-worker-maximizing output is smaller when its marginal cost is 
i i i ir k x t  than when its marginal cost is i i ir k x . Q.E.D. 
 
  We now present the equilibrium of the model introduced in the previous section. Both Ri(x–i) 
and Ri
*(x–i) slope downwards. If none of the firms provides a wage-rise contract to its workers, 
then the unique equilibrium occurs at the intersection of R1(x–1), R2(x–2), …, Rn(x–n). Therefore, if 
firm i chooses xi
* and offers a wage-rise contract, then its marginal cost of output has a 
discontinuity at xi = xi
*. Lemma 3 states that the provision of a wage-rise contract by firm i 
decreases its optimal quantity. The labour-managed firms choose quantities in a Cournot fashion. 
We now characterize the equilibrium of the model in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: In the equilibrium of the labour-managed oligopoly model with complementary 
goods, none of the labour-managed firms offers a wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment. 
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Proof: We consider firm i’s Stackelberg leader output. If firm i is the Stackelberg leader, then it 
selects ix  and the other firms select their outputs after observing ix . When firm i is the 
Stackelberg leader, it maximizes ( , ( ))i i ix R x  with respect to ix . Therefore, firm i’s 
Stackelberg leader output satisfies the following first-order condition: 
  0.i i i i ii i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i
p dk dl p dRx p r l p x rk f x l
x dx dx x dx
                (11) 
Here 0i
i
p
x
 (Assumption 1) and 0i
i
dR
dx
 (Lemma 2). To satisfy (11), 
i i i
i i i i i i i i i
i i i
p dk dlx p r l p x rk f
x dx dx
 needs to be negative. Hence, each firm’s 
Stackelberg leader output is higher than its Cournot output. 
  On the other hand, Lemma 3 states that firm i’s optimal output is smaller when it adopts a 
wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment than when it does not. In addition, Lemma 1 
means that ( )i iR x  is always downward sloping. Thus, the proposition is proved. Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 1 means that the equilibrium coincides with the Cournot solution with no wage-rise 
contracts. 
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4. Conclusion 
  We have shown the equilibrium of quantity-setting oligopoly competition in which 
labour-managed firms can offer wage-rise contracts as a strategic commitment devise. Ohnishi 
(2007) examines a labour-managed Cournot duopoly model with substitute goods shows that 
there is an equilibrium in which at least one labour-managed firm offers a wage-rise contract as 
a strategic commitment. As a result, we find that our results are quite different from the results 
obtained from the labour-managed Cournot oligopoly model with substitute goods. 
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